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RESPONSES TO 'filE 'I,EN QUESTIONS 
Robert Knowlest 
8. DOES AL QAEDA POSE AN EXISTENTIAL THREAT TO THE UNITED 
STATES? 
10. WHEN WILL THE UNITED STATES CEASE TO BE THE WORLD'S 
NUMBER-oNE POWER? 
The United Stat~s cannot effectively pursue its national securi-
ty interests without taking into account its unique position in the 
world. How powerful is the United States? Is it an empire? Is its 
influence in decline? Who are its major rivals? And who or 
what represents an existential threat? 
These questions are crucial for U.S. national security law as 
well, but their importance is often overlooked. Debates about the 
scope of executive power in foreign affairs are framed as necessity 
versus the rule of law. The political branches establish a foreign 
policy and the means of p.ursuing it, and the President does what is 
necessary to protect the nation. The courts' task is not to deter-
mine what works. It is to decide whether, and how much, to con-
strain the exercise of power if the law requires it. 
The result is a very high level of deference by the courts to the 
executive branch in national security cases. Even compelling con-
stitutional values like liberty and due process can seem like abstrac-
tions in light of the urgent, concrete need to protect the nation. 
And if those whom the Government acts against such as nonciti-
zens captured and detained abroad have no connection to U.S. 
society, the courts are likely to defer even more. When the Consti-
tution was drafted and ratified, America pursued neutrality to avoid 
t Robert Knowles is a Visiting Assistant Professor of Chicago-Kent College of 
Law, Professor Knowles has published articles on foreign affairs, national security 
law, and constitutional law in the Iowa Law Review, the DePaul Law Review, the 
NYU Annual Survey of American Law, and other law journals. Since 2004, he has 
represented sixteen Yemeni detainees at Guantanamo Bay Naval Base. 
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all entanglements with stronger European powers.1 In this context, 
could the Framers have intended for the rights enumerated in the 
Constitution to apply to everyone, everywhere in the world? Would 
the public have interpreted the language this wayi~ 
The world has changed, of course. The United States is no 
longer a weak power, but at least for now the strongest power. 
And it plays a very different role in the world today than it did at 
the end of the eighteenth century. The Constitution's original 
meaning to the extent we can discern it still matters. But where 
original meaning and history are indeterminate, courts and scho-
lars turn to functionalism to decide the appropriate allocation of 
power among the branches in national security cases. Functional-
ism is about what works. Effectiveness in national security law, as in 
national security policy, depends on taking into account how the 
United States relates to the rest of the world. 
It may seem strange that views of international relations should 
affect the courts' views of its role. But the impact has been there, if 
usually unarticulated, since at least the early twentieth century. In 
perhaps the most influential foreign affairs decision, Curtiss-Wright, 
the Supreme Court connected the nature of the world a "vast ex-
ternal realm, with its important, complicated, delicate and mani-
fold problems" to relaxed constraints on delegations of power to 
the President.3 Curtiss-Wright, which is still cited by the Government 
to justify broad executive power in foreign affilirs, was decided 
against the backdrop of a world in crisis, with Nazi Germany and 
Imperial japan on the rise and World War II just three years away.4 
Since 9/11, scholars applying functional approaches have tended 
to conclude that terrorism represents a danger justifying greater 
deference by the courts to the President.5 Transnational terrorist 
1. HENRY KissiNGER, DIPLOMACY 32-36 (1994). 
2. See generally J. Andrew Kent, A Textual and Historical Case Against a Global 
Constitution, 95 GEO. LJ. 463 (2007) (arguing from history and the text and struc-
ture of the Constitution that noncitizens abroad lack constitutional rights). 
3. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936). 
4. See G. JOHN IKENBERRY, LIBERAL ORDER 8c IMPERIAL AMBmoN 150-51 
(2006). 
5. See, e.g., BRUCE ACKERMAN, BEFORE TifE NEXT ATTACK: PRESERVING CiviL 
LIBERTIES IN AN AGE OF TERRORISM 101-0S (2006); ERIC A. POSNER & ADRIAN 
VERMEULE, TERROR IN 1HE BALANCE: SECURI1Y, LIBERlY, AND THE COURTS 180-81 
(2007). But s• Robert Knowles, American R and tM Foreign Affairs Constitu-
tion, 41 ARiz. ST. LJ. 87 (2009) (applying international relations theory to these-
paration of powers and concluding that courts should not give special deference 
to the executive branch in foreign affairs cases); Deborah N. Pearlstein, Furm and 
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groups such as al Qaeda are labeled an existential threat equivalent 
to the Soviet Union during the Cold War, and Nazi Germany and 
Imperial Japan during World War II. Now, as then, an unstable 
world requires the speed, expertise, secrecy, and uniformity found 
only in the executive branch. The federal cottrts, by contrast, move 
slowly, lack special foreign affairs expertise, and rarely reach uni-
form decisions. 
But al Qaeda is a far different enemy from Nazi Germany. 
Though al Qaeda has enjoyed the support of governments at one 
time or another, it draws recruits and financial support from all 
over the world. It operates across borders. Unlike a nation-state, it 
does not sign treaties or possess sovereignty. It has no army in the 
traditional sense and cannot conquer territory. It does not operate 
a government or embassies. These differences matter for the way 
courts should view their role in national security cases. 
It is important for courts to be aware of American power be-
cause it determines how the United States interacts with the rest of 
the world. In the 1930s, the world was divided into spheres of in-
fluence by great powers with roughly equal economic and military 
capability. During the Cold War, the United States vied with the 
Soviet Union for dominance. Since 1991, however, the United 
States has been the only nation capable of projecting military force 
anywhere in the world. Debates have raged for decades about how 
to measure America's power and how to describe the international 
system. 
The United States has been labeled the lone superpower, a 
h 6 h 7 d · 8 Th d ·· yperpower, a egemon, an an empire. ese escnptions 
have long co-existed with predictions of more or less imminent U.S. 
decline.9 During the 1980s, for example, scholars complained 
Function in the National &curity Constitution, 41 CoNN. L. REv. 1549 (2009) (using 
organization theory to argue that a functional approach to the separation of pow-
ers in national security cases requires more court supervision). 
6. See, e.g., Eliot A Cohen, History and the Hyperpower, FOREIGN AFF., July-Aug. 
2004, at 49, 49. 
7. See, e.g., LEA BRILMAYER, AMERICAN HEGEMONY: PounCAL MORAI.IIY IN A 
ONE-SUPERPOWER WORI.n (1994) (arguing that American hegemony is a form of 
international governance and must be evaluated by liberals in the same way they 
would evaluate the legitimacy of domestic political arrangements). 
8. Daniel H. Nexon & Thomas Wright, Wha(s at Stake in the American Empire 
Debate, 101 AM. PoL. Sa. REv. 253, 253 (2007) (observing that scholars on both the 
left and right describe the United States as an empire); Joseph S. Nye, Jr., U.S. 
Power and Strategy After Iraq, FoREIGN AFF.,july-Aug. 2003, at 60, 60 (same). 
9. See PAUL KENNEDY, THE RISE AND FAil. OF 1HE GRFAT POWERS: ECONOMIC 
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about U.S. imperialisrn in Central America while concluding that 
Japan's economic strength would allow it to surpass the United 
States as the world's preeminent power. During the 1990s, realist 
international-relations scholars began to struggle with understand-
ing the behavior of nations in the unipolar system that had re-
placed the bipolar Cold War system. In the first half of the 2000s, 
the already vast United States-as-empire literature bloomed on both 
ends of the political spectrum, in part as a response to the more 
aggressive foreign policies of the Bush administration following 
9/11.10 During the second half of the decade, however, the narra-
tive of U.S. decline and the rise of its rivals again gained momen-
n tum. 
Many of these disagreements result from semantic differenc-
es and a loose use of the term "empire."12 In addition, assessments 
of the U.S. global position will vary, depending on the importance 
one places, respectively, on military, economic, and soft power.1s 
But as measured in terms of military power, the United States still 
predominates. It accounted for half of the world's military spend-
ing in 2007 and holds enormous advantages in defense technology 
that far outstrip would-be competitors.14 No other great power has 
possessed such a relative advantage in modern history.15 This ad-
vantage is so vast that it will likely prevent rivals from counter-
balancing the United States on a global scale for decades. 
America's advantage is compounded by other factors. First, 
the United States enjoys geographic isolation from its major poten-
CHANGE AND MnlTARY CoNFLicr FROM 1500 TO 2000 514 (Vintage Books 1989) 
(1987) (predicting the decline of the United States); JOHN J. MEARSHEIMER, THE 
TRAGEDY OF GREAT POWER POLITICS 392 (2001) (arguing that regional hegemons 
will arise to challenge American dominance). 
10. See, e.g., NIALL FERGUSON, COLOSSUS: THE PRICE OF AMERICA'S EMPIRE 
(2004); RS JOHNSON, THE SORROWS OF EMPIRE: MIUTARISM, SECRECY, AND lHE 
END OF TilE REPUBUC (2004). 
11. See, e.g., PARAG KHANNA, THE SECOND WORLD: EMPIRES AND INFl.UENCE IN 
1HE NE\V GLOBAL ORDER (2008); FAREED ZAKARIA, THE POST-AMERICAN WORlD 
(2008). 
12. Nexon & Wright, supra note 8, at 253. 
13. See Nye, supra note 8 (observing that the United States occupies a differ-
ent global position with respect to military, economic, and soft power). For many 
realists, soft power is least important, if it can even be considered a form of power 
at all. See MF'..ARsHEIMER, supra note 9, at 5 (defining power in military terms). 
14. , supra note 11, at 181-82. 
15. See William C. Wohlforth, Tl~e Stability of a Unipolar World, 24 INT'L 
SECURilY 5 (1999) (observing that America's military's advantage is larger now 
than any analogous gap in the history of the modern state system). 
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tial rivals including China, Russia, Europe, and India who are 
located relatively near one another in Eurasia.16 This mutes the se-
curity threat that the U~ited. States seems to pose while increasinR 
the threats that potenual nvals seem to pose to one another. 
Second, because unipolarity is now entrenched as the status quo, 
nations seeking to counter-balance the United States must over-
come free-rider problems in order to do so. Third, nuclear wea-
pons make the concentration of power in the United States appear 
less threatening. Just as other powers cannot conquer the United 
States, they, too, cannot be conquered. This makes war between 
great powers in today's world much less likely and reinforces the 
stability of the international order.18 Finally, globalization the in-
creasing integration and standardization of markets and cultures-
also tends to stabilize the global system and reduce conflict.19 
While in military terms the world remains unipolar for now, 
the picture is more complicated when it comes to economic and 
soft power. The gross domestic product of the Eurozone now ex-
ceeds that of the United States. Although 2007 projections had the 
U.S. economy remaining substantially larger than China's for the 
next two decades, China will overtake the United States in some 
measures such as manufacturing output before then. Some also 
believe that China's large investment in U.S. currency above $1 
trillion (more than twenty percent of total foreign-held U.S. Trea-
sury securities) in 2009 gives it leverage over the United States 
and constrains U.S. foreign policy.20 America's soft power the 
ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion 
or payments is much harder to measure.21 Global regard for the 
16. Potential rivals include China, Europe, Japan, and India. See ZAKARIA, su-
pra note 11, at 81-86. 
17. Stephen G. Brooks & William C. Wohlforth, International &lations Tlteory 
and the Case Against Unilateralism, 3 PERSP. ON POL. 509, 511 (2005) [hereinafter 
Brooks & Wohlfarth, Unilateralism]. 
18. Stephen G. Brooks & William C. Wohlforth, Hard Times for Soft Balancing, 
30 INT'LSECURI1Y72, 106 (2005) [hereinafter Brooks & Wohlforth, Hard Tinw]. 
19. See G. John Ikenberry, Liberalism an.d Empire: Logics of Order in the American 
Unipolar Age, 30 REv. OF INT'L S1UD. 609, 617 (2004). 
20. China's ownership of U.S. debt can also be seen as limiting China's op-
tions, however, because China owns far too much in U.S. currency to sell off a sig-
nificant amount without reducing the value of its remaining dollar-dominated as-
sets. See ~7AYNE M. MORRISON & MARC LABONTE, CONGRESSIONAL REsEARCH SERVICE, 
CHINA'S HOLDINGS OF U.S. SECURITIES: IMPUCATIONS FOR THE U.S. ECONOMY 9 
(2009). 
21. See JOSEPH S. NYE, JR., SOFT POWER: THE MEANS TO SUCCESS IN \\70RLD 
Pouncs (2004) (observing that soft power arises from the attractiveness of a 
5066 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 36:5 
U.S. Government's policies waxes and wanes, and varies a great deal 
from region to region. United States culture remains highly in~ 
fluential. Global public opinion of the United States improved 
during 2009, but the degree that this measures soft power is uncer-
tain. 22 But it is the relative decline in economic and soft power that 
has led m'any scholars to conclude that the world is now multi-
polar. 
These measures of U.S. power do not tell the whole story, 
however. The United States plays a unique role in the world. It 
provides a number of global public goods.23 These include security 
guarantees, the_ protection of sea lanes, and support for open mar-
kets.24 Because of its ovetwhelming military might, the Unite-d 
States possesses what amounts to a "quasi-monopoly" on the use of 
force.2 · This prevents other nations from launching wars large 
enough to truly destabilize the international system. Mter World 
War II, the United States forge_d a system of military alliances that 
still preseiVe stability around the world. The United States provides 
security for allies such as Japan and Germany by maintaining a 
strong military presence in Asia and Europe.26 The United States 
also provides a public good through its efforts to combat terrorism 
and confront rogue states_.27' In the economic realm, the United 
States supports crucial underpinnings for the system of global 
trade. The U.S. dollar is still the world's reserve currency. The 
United States led efforts to create the World Trade Organization 
and other institutions such as the International Monetary Fund 
country's culture, political ideals, and policies). 
22. See PEw GLOBAL A'rilTUDES PROJECI', CONFIDENCE IN 0BAMA LIFTS U.S. 
IMAGE AROUND THE WORLD (July 23, 2009), available at 
http:/ /pewglobal.org/reports/display.php?ReportiD=264. 
23. Public goods are "nonrivalrous" capable of being simultaneously con-
sumed by the provider and others and "nonexcludable" impossible to keep 
others from consu-ming. John 0. McGinnis & Ilya Somin, Should International Law 
Be Part of Our Law 7, 59 STAN. L. REv. 1175,. 1236 (2007). 
-24. MICHAEL MANDELMUM, THE CAsE FOR GoLIA1H: HOW AMERICA ACIS AS 'nJE 
WORLD'S GoVERNMENT IN lHE TwENIY-FlRST CENTURY 34-62 (2005) (describing the 
public goods -provided by the United States for the world). 
'25. Ikenberry, supra note· 19, at 618 ("The· United States possesses a quasi-
monopoly on the international use of force while the domestic institutions and 
behaviors of states are increasingly open to global that is, American scrutiny/'). 
26. I d. at 609. 
27. See, e.g., MANDELBAUM,_ supra note 24,_ at 163 (observing that forceful U.S. 
measures to prevent rogue states from acquiring nuclear weapons permitted Eu-
rope and China to adopt more conciliatory postures toward those regimes); see also 
TODD SANDLER, GLOBAL COIJ.ECITVE ACl'ION 144-61 (2004) (applying public goods 
theory to the control of rogue states). 
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and the World Bank that remain in place today. The United 
States does not produce these global public goods from altruism: as 
the largest consumer of these goods, it benefits from them the 
most. 
Of course, the United States supplies these public goods im-
perfectly. Pirates prey on shipping in some places (often with im-
punity), and rogue states continue to develop nuclear weapons~ 
And while the United States intervened to stop human rights viola-
tions in some instances, such as ethnic cleansing in Kosovo,28 it took 
no action with respect to others, like the genocide in Rwanda.29 
Moreover, there are many important global public goods such as 
addressing ··weakest-link" collective-action problems like climate 
change that the United States cannot provide-alone.30 Nonethe-
less, no other nation currently has the capacity to provide these 
goods. Were the United States to withdraw from its global-
governance role, chaos would result. As the largest public-goods 
consumer, the United States would suffer the _most. 
The difficulty is that other nations frequently resent the out-
sized role that the United States plays in international affairs. Why 
should the United States enjoy the b_enefits of having the dollar as 
the world's reserve currency when the Eurozone has a_ larger GDP? 
The vast overseas military presence required to provide security 
guarantees, and the combat operations required to fight terrorism 
and confront rogue states, inevitably result in blowback. The 2003 
Iraq invasion brought the relative power of the United States into 
stark relief and contributed to weariness of American power. 
On the other hand, other nations seem unwilling, for now at 
least, to relinquish the benefits that come from U.S. leadership. 
Germany and Japan, for example, can focus on developing their 
economies rather than their militaries, confident that the United 
States will p_rovide security. When China holds U.S. dollars, it can 
export manufacturing goods to the United States more cheaply. 
28. See Bartram S. Brown, Humanitarian Intervention at a Crossroads, 41 WM. & 
MARYL. REv. 1683, 1690 (2000) C'Military action to aid the Kosovar Albanians was 
the right thing to do.")-; Ruth ~7edgwood, NATO's Campaign in Yugoslavia, 93 AM. J. 
INT'LL. 828, 828 (1999) (noting that NATO's action in Kosovo "may also mark the 
emergence of a limited and conditional right of humanitarian intetvention" in in-
ternational law). 
29. SeeS . POWER, A PROBLEM FROM HEIJ.: AMERICA AND 1HE AGE OF 
GENOCDE (2003). 
30. See Paul G~ Harris, Collective Action on Climate Change: The Logic of Regime 
Failure, 47 NAT. REsOURCES J. 195 (2007). 
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And while few other nations are willing to invest blood and treasure 
to combat terrorism in Mghanistan, most nations enjoy the benefits 
of keeping al Qaeda at bay. 
But there is another reason why other nations are willing to 
bandwagon with, rather than seek to counter-balance, the United 
States. They have a voice in American government, which provides 
multiple access points. Foreign citizens, corporations, and gov-
ernments can lobby Congress and executive branch agencies in the 
State, Treasury, Defense, and Commerce Deparunents, where for-
eign policy is made. 31 Even f'rogue states" such as Myanmar have 
their lobbyists in Washington.32 They use the media to broadcast 
their point of view in an effort to influence the opinion of decision-
makers.33 Because the United States is a nation of immigrants, 
many American citizens have a specific interest in the fates of par-
ticular countries and form "ethnic lobbies" for the purpose of af-
fecting foreign policy.34 The courts, too, are accessible to foreign 
nations and non-citizens, whose involvement in U.S. litigation 
grows larger each year. The benefit of multiple access points is that 
if one fails, another can be tried: foreign governments facing unfa-
vorable court decisions can and do appeal or seek reversal through 
political channels. 
It is the uniqueness, rather than just the level, of American 
power that has led some to label the United States as an empire. 
But the label does not really fit. Empires consist of a "rimless-hub-
and-spoke structure," with an imperial core the preeminent 
state ruling the periphery through intermediaries.~ The United 
States is very powerful and maintains a military presence through-
out the world. The Status of Force Agreements ("SOFAs") that go-
vern legal rights and responsibilities of U.S. military personnel and 
others on U.S. bases throughout the world are typically one-sided.36 
31. The post-Cold War era has seen an acceleration in the trend that began in 
the mid-1970s, away from foreign policy conducted by an elite group within the 
executive branch toward one involving a much broader community. See John T. 
Tierney, Interest Group Involvement in Congressional Foreign and Defense Policy, in 
CONGRESS RESURGENT 89,95-98 (Randall B. Ripley &James M. Lindsay eds., 1993). 
32. Michael Isikoff, Mac's Convention Quandary~, NE\VSWEEK, May 19, 2008, at 5. 
33. See MANDEI.BAUM, supra note 24, at 165. 
34. McGinnis 8c Somin, supra note 23, at 1245. 
35. Nexon 8c Wright, supra note 8, at 258. 
36. See Ryan M. Scoville, A Sociological Approach to the Negotiation of Military Base 
Agreements, 14 U. Ml&\fi INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 1, 6 (2006) (''\\7ith great consistency, 
the United States has ... leveraged its international power to obtain base agree-
ments that heavily favor U.S. interests over those of receiving states."). 
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And the United States performs many global-governance functions. 
But it does not rule other nations. Although the United States may 
exercise pseudo-imperial influence in a few nations like Iraq and 
Mghanistan, ••empire" does not describe the relationship between 
the United States and the rest of the world. 
Moreover, stability in empires depends on the imperial core 
keeping nations on the periphery from communicating with one 
another and forming alliances. All roads must lead to Rome. Al-
though many roads lead to Washington, it would be impossible for 
the United States to maintain imperial rule in an era of globaliza-
tion, even if it wanted to. The United States simply lacks sufficient 
control over the flow of information. When the United States 
strikes a bargain with one nation, others know about it immediate-
ly. The SOFAs with Iraq and Mghanistan are the subject of much 
public debate. When things go awry with the exercise of American 
military might as with Guantanamo, secret prisons, and Abu 
Ghraib the world pays attention. And other powers, such as Chi-
na, have formed their own relationships with nations across the 
globe. 
In the end, the label for America's role probably does not mat-
ter as much as the reality. How should courts take cognizance of 
this reality? There are two important consequences for the U.S. 
separation of powers. First, the unipolar nature of the internation-
al system puts the United States at the center of the action in world 
affairs. The stability and legitimacy of the system depends more on 
successful functioning of the U.S. Government as a whole than it 
does on balancing alliances crafted by elite statesmen practicing 
realpolitik. "[W] orld power politics are shaped primarily . . . by the 
foreign policy developed in Washington."37 For better or worse, the 
laws that will be applied in combating terrorism worldwide will be 
in large- measure the laws domestic and international that the 
U.S. Government chooses to apply. 
Second, unipolarity increases the power of the U.S. executive 
branch, which faces fewer external constraints than it would in a 
world with several great powers balancing one another militarily.38 
This became especially apparent with America's post-9/11 deten-
tion policies. At one time, the executive branch faced much more 
37. Campbell Craig, American Realism Versus American Imperialism, 57 WORI.D 
POL 143, 169 (2004). 
38. Daniel Abe be, Great Power Politics and the Structure of £qreign Relations Law, 
10 CHI. J. INT'L L. 125, 125 (2009). 
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exogenous pressure from other great powers to comply with inter-
national law in the treatment of captured enemies. If the United 
States strayed too far from established norms, it would risk retalia-
tion upon its own soldiers or other sanctions from powerful rivals. 
Today, there are few such constraints: enemies such as al Qaeda are 
not great powers in the traditional sense and are not likely to obey 
international law anyway. Instead, the danger is that American 
rule-breaking will undermine the legitimacy of U.S. leadership. 
America's military predominance enables it to set the rules of the 
game. When the United States breaks its own rules, it loses legiti-
macy. 
With U.S. legitimacy at stake, it follows that courts should be 
more, not less; active in national security cases. Courts are widely 
regarded as rule-based institutions, rather than political institu-
tions, that can ensure that the political branches do not short-
circuit processes for changing the law or act to violate fundamental 
constitutional principles.. The approval of courts lends legitimacy 
to government action. When other nations see the, United States 
following the law, they are more likely to acquiesce in U.S. leader-
ship. This makes this task of providing global public goods such 
as fighting terrorism easier for the United States. As the largest 
public-goods consumer, the United States benefits the most from 
perceptions of its own legitimacy. 
Legitimacy becomes especially important in view of declining 
U.S .. influence relative to other powers. The world may not be mul-
ti-polar today, but it could be by mid-century. America's enormous 
military advantage will decrease over time, and its reduced share of 
global economic output will .give it less ability to throw its weight 
around. Although the costs for the United States of disregarding 
international legal norms may seem worth it now, those costs will 
increase from year-to-year. To the extent that international institu-
tions including frameworks of international law provide some 
"stickiness," the United States is better off investing its own legiti-
,macy in these institutions now, while it has maximum influence. If 
the United States leaves its imprint on international law an,d institu-
tions, they will be less costly for the United States to comply with in 
the future and much more cosdy for a rising rival, such as China, to 
• tgnore. 
Nonetheless, there are some who argue that we are already liv-
ing in a multi-polar world, and that rogue states and terrorist 
groups like al Qaeda are our true rivals. Advances in technology 
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will if they do not already enable terrorists or rogue states to 
deploy small nuclear and biological weapons to threaten American 
cities, making up in sheer mayhem what they lack in armies and 
navies. A nuclear explosion in a large metropolitan area such as 
New York has the potential to change life as we know it. In this 
sense, al Qaeda can be viewed as an existential threat. 59 
However, the capacity for small groups to leverage extremism 
into great destruction does not alter the fundamental structure of 
geopolitics. Not all existential threats are the same. A nuclear de-
vice would be just as dangerous in the hands of a domestic group 
or a lone wolf as it would be in the hands of al Qaeda. It would be 
a mistake to assume that these new threats are best pursued by giv-
ing the executive branch greater deference. In fact, the dangers 
from terrorism make even clearer the need to adhere to estab-
lished principles. The United States will occupy a global leadership 
role for decades to come. Successful management of global cris-
es including a catastrophic terrorist attack lies not in counter-
balancing rivals, but in better management of the international sys-
tem. The United States cannot hope to tackle large-scale global 
problems terrorism especially if the rest of the world loses con-
fidence in American leadership. The best way for courts to help 
carry out this task is to ensttre that the political branches adhere to 
the rule of law. 
39. See PHIUP BOBBirl', TERROR AND CONSENT: THEW ARS FOR THE TwENTY-FIRST 
CENTURY 201-02 (2008) (stating that an existential threat ••is precisely the sort of 
threat that terror poses"). But see Fareed Zakaria, True or False: We Need a Wartime 
President, NE\YSWEEK, July 14, 2008, at 48 (rejecting arguments that al Qaeda or 
Iran represent existential threats to the United States). 
